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Abstract
When a downstream producer enters backward into the input market, a “helping the rivals” eﬀect exists: such entry hurts the ﬁrm’s
downstream business as it increases upstream competition and thus
reduces the input price for rival downstream ﬁrms. This negative externality prevents the newly-created upstream unit from expanding.
A spin-oﬀ enables the ﬁrm to credibly expand in the input market,
forcing the upstream competitors to behave less aggressively, a task
direct entry could not accomplish. The ﬁrm chooses not to spin-oﬀ
(and remain self-suﬃcient) if the number of downstream ﬁrms, n, is
small; a complete spin-oﬀ if n is large; and a partial spin-oﬀ if n is in
the intermediate range. Spin-oﬀs can lower welfare by worsening the
double-marginalization problem.
JEL Classiﬁcation: L13, L22, L42
Keywords: Spin-oﬀ, commitment, vertical relationship, externality.
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Introduction

During the 1990s, rapid technological progress in the global economy has been
accompanied by a wave of spin-oﬀs. In 1995, corporations spun oﬀ $48 billion
worth of stock and about $70 billion in 19961 . Among the most noteworthy
spin-oﬀs, was the voluntary spin-oﬀ of AT&T’s communication equipment
arm and acclaimed Bell Labs research unit in 1996 as Lucent Technologies
Inc., and its computer division as NCR Corp. In April 1999, Siemens Group
announced its decision to spin oﬀ the Siemens Semiconductor Group as a
100% subsidiary under the name Inﬁneon Technologies AG, becoming the
largest spin-oﬀ in European history. The goal of this paper is to provide a
strategic theory of when and why ﬁrms ﬁnd it attractive to generate spin-oﬀs
and to shed light on the welfare consequences of such a strategy.
Two hypotheses regrading the motives of spin-oﬀs can be found in the literature of ﬁnancial restructuring, both related to value creation. According
the core-operation hypothesis, spin-oﬀs create value by removing unrelated
businesses and allowing managers to focus attention on the core operations
of a company. Spin-oﬀs can also help eliminate the cross subsidization that
is common in large companies. The information hypothesis states that the
separation of a ﬁrm’s divisions into independently traded units through a
spin-oﬀ enhances value because it mitigates information asymmetries about
the ﬁrm (Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999)). In particular, spin-oﬀs
1

Treasury & Risk Management, January/February, 1997.
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isolate slow-growth segments of a large company and thus help provide ﬁnancial clarity to investors.
The economic literature, on the other hand, has not paid much attention to spin-oﬀs and their welfare eﬀects, presumably because of the belief
that, unlike mergers, spin-oﬀs increase the number of ﬁrms and thus must
always be pro-competitive. While some companies (General Motors, e.g.)
do choose to break up its line of products into competing units, many spinoﬀs in practice take place in a vertical market structure whereby an increase
in the number of ﬁrms does not necessarily lead to higher degree of competition. The spin-oﬀ of Lucent Technologies by AT&T, for example, is a
kind of cross-industry spin-oﬀ wherein the spun oﬀ unit and the continuation unit have a supplier-customer relationship.2 Prior to the spin oﬀ, AT&T
was the main customer of its communication equipment unit. Now Lucent
also supplies equipments to other telecommunication service providers such
as MCI/WorldCom, British Telecommunications, and the Cable & Wireless
(USA). By the end of 1996, shortly after the spin-oﬀ, more than 50 percent
of the Lucent venues came from other competitors of AT&T.3 In situations
like this, one wonders why would a company spin oﬀ its input unit which
then supplies an input to its competitors in the ﬁnal product market.4
2

To a centain extent, Siemens AG’s spinning oﬀ Inﬁneon also belongs to this type. Like
Inﬁneon’s other computer chips customers, Siemens AG also makes computers itself.
3
Photonics Spectra News, November 1996.
4
See Pack and Saggi (2001) for a model in which technology transfer to a supplier may
help a ﬁrm’s downstream competitor but yet the ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁt maximizing to engage
in it.
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The paper oﬀers an explanation of why spin-oﬀs may occur based on
strategic considerations. The theory I propose here is as follows. Consider
the incentive of a self-suﬃcient producer in a two-tier industry to enter backward into the input market. While generating new proﬁts in the input market, such entry by the ﬁrm beneﬁts its downstream rival ﬁrms by increasing
upstream competition and thus reducing the input price (a “helping the rivals
eﬀect”). This negative externality prevents the newly-created upstream unit
from expanding. Following a spin-oﬀ, the independent spun-oﬀ unit does not
have to worry about the downstream business of its parent ﬁrm. While it
may hurt the parent company, such “sub-optimal” behavior on the part of
the spun-oﬀ unit enables the ﬁrm to increase its share of the input market in
a credible way and thus forces it upstream competitors to be less aggressive.
Using a model with linear demand and Cournot ﬁrms at both the upstream and the downstream markets, I examine the spin-oﬀ decision by a
given downstream ﬁrm. I ﬁrst study the case of direct entry whereby the ﬁrm
concerned enters the input market without a spin-oﬀ and then serves other
downstream competitors (along with the incumbent upstream supplier). I
then consider two spin-oﬀ strategies of the ﬁrm. Under a partial spin-oﬀ,
the downstream ﬁrm continues to be self-suﬃcient in input supply. Under a
complete spin-oﬀ, on the other hand, the parent ﬁrm has to buy the input
from the upstream suppliers at the market price. Which strategy maximizes
the joint proﬁts of the parent company and the spun-oﬀ ﬁrm depends on the
degree of competition in the downstream market. The following results are
4

obtained. The ﬁrm never chooses to enter directly into the input market,
due to the “helping the rivals eﬀect”. It will choose a complete spin-oﬀ if the
number of downstream producers is large (n ≥ 8). If the number of downstream ﬁrms is small (n < 4), no-spin-oﬀ (and no entry) is the best decision.
If n is in the intermediate range (4 ≤ n ≤ 7), a partial spin-oﬀ maximizes
joint proﬁts.
The intuition for these results is as follows. The basic trade-oﬀ associated
with entering into the input market mentioned earlier is present under both
direct entry and spin-oﬀs. Entry into the input market enables a ﬁrm to
capture proﬁts from the upstream market but at the same time hurts the its
downstream business. In the model considered here, the negative eﬀect is so
strong that direct entry is never proﬁtable for the ﬁrm. A spin-oﬀ confers a
strategic advantage on the ﬁrm: Since the spin-oﬀ does not have to worry
about it downstream parent unit, it behaves more aggressively (relative to
a wholly owned unit), thereby forcing its upstream competitors to concede
a portion of their market shares. When downstream market competition is
intense (n ≥ 8), the downstream business is not as important and thus a
complete spin-oﬀ becomes attractive. When n is in the intermediate range,
the ﬁrm chooses a partial spin-oﬀ so as to realize the strategic advantage in
the input market while still protecting its downstream business by making
the input in house.
I also examine the eﬀects of spin-oﬀs on output, price and welfare. A
complete spin-oﬀ always reduces welfare and raises the price of the ﬁnal
5

product. Since it buys the input at the market pricing, the parent company
under a complete spin-oﬀ suﬀers from the standard double marginalization
problem. The loss due to the increased double marginalization is so large
that it outweighs the beneﬁt of increased upstream competition caused by
a spin-oﬀ. Consequently, social welfare declines under a complete spin-oﬀ.
A partial spin-oﬀ, on the other hand, improves social welfare and lowers the
price of the ﬁnal product. This is so because a partial spin-oﬀ enhances
upstream competition without pushing the downstream parent ﬁrm into the
double marginalization problem.
The prediction of the model that increased competition in the downstream
market can lead to spin-oﬀs is consistent with what has been happening in
the telecommunications industry in the United States. Since the break-up of
AT&T in 1984, new entrants into the industry have been emerged, and are
posing a serious threat to the traditional local phone companies and long distance carriers. The US Congress in 1996 passed a Telecommunication Act,
which allows AT&T and other long distance companies, as well as Cable
TV companies, to participate in local phone market. The local phone companies are in turn allowed to participate in the long distance market. The
removals of the regulatory barriers on diﬀerent segments of telephone service
markets substantially boosts the demand for telecommunication equipment.
It is under this atmosphere of increased competition in the downstream service market that AT&T decided to spin oﬀ its upstream telecommunication
equipment arm to form Lucent Technologies Inc.
6

This paper is related to several studies in the existing industrial organization literature. First, several authors have recently studied divisionalization
strategies of ﬁrms, whereby companies, such as General Motors, choose the
number of (autonomous) divisions before these divisions compete in the product market.5 The use of divisions can creditably enable ﬁrms to commit to
large output level, thereby increasing their market shares. Unlike my paper
here, however, this branch of studies focuses on horizontal settings and hence
does not address the issue of commitment value created by a spin-oﬀ in the
upstream market.
In an important paper, Tan and Yuan (1997) consider ﬁrm incentive for
divestitures in a model with two ﬁrms (or shopping malls) each supplying a
group of products. Products across the two ﬁrms are substitutes while that
within each group are complements. Divestiture by a ﬁrm (selling oﬀ a subset
of its product lines) imposes a negative externality on the complementary
goods within its group and thus raises the prices levels of these complements.
However, this increase in prices of its own goods softens the competition from
the other ﬁrm. This indirect, “cross-group” eﬀect leads to divestitures by
both ﬁrms. Although also addressing the incentive for break-ups, the model
of Tan and Yuan diﬀers from my in that ﬁrms in their model do not have
supplier-customer relationships. As a result, the directly eﬀect of a spinoﬀ in my model, namely to supply other downstream competitors, is not
5

See Baye, Croker and Ju (1996) for analysis of divisionlization strategies in a homogeneous product setting, and Yuan (1999) and Saggi and Vettas (2001), in a diﬀerentiated
product setting.
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present in their model. However, their result that divestitures reduce social
welfare is parallel to the negative welfare eﬀect of spin-oﬀs in the present
paper. As these authors pointed out, this negative welfare eﬀect of breakups corresponds to that of Economides and Salop (1992) who argued that
for complementary products, mergers reduce prices and increase welfare.
Finally, my paper is related to recently studies of incentives for vertical
separation in oligopoly. For example, Bonanno and Vickers (1988) show
that vertical separation can be used to reduce upstream competition in an
duopoly. Cyrenne (1994) analyzed a vertical integration-vertical separation
game in a model and demonstrated that vertical separation and vertical
integration can co-exist in equilibrium. In these models, vertical separation
means that a manufacturer and its retailer stay as separate ﬁrms and a
manufacturer does not supply the retailers of other manufacturers. Thus,
the “helping the rivals eﬀect” of a spin-oﬀ, which is the driving force behind
all the results in my paper, is not present in these models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic
model and presents a general argument regarding the strategic value of spinoﬀs. Section 3 considers the benchmark case that the candidate ﬁrm for spinoﬀ is self-suﬃcient in input supply. Section 4 and section 5 analyze partial
spin-oﬀ and complete spin-oﬀ, respectively. Section 6 examines welfare eﬀects
of spin-oﬀs and discusses policy implications. Section 7 concludes.
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2

The Model

There are initially one upstream ﬁrm, U2 , and n ≥ 2 downstream ﬁrms
indexed by Di , i = 1, 2, ..., n. The upstream ﬁrm supplies an input (an
intermediate good) to all the n downstream ﬁrms, except D1 , which then
transform the input into a ﬁnal product. Firm D1 is able to produce the
input itself. Assume that one unit of ﬁnal product requires exactly one unit
of input (the ﬁxed-coeﬃcient technology). The price of the intermediate
good is denoted by w. The unit cost of transforming the input into the ﬁnal
product is cT . The marginal cost of producing the input is c for both D1 and
U2 . Thus, the marginal cost of production for the ﬁnal product is c + cT for
ﬁrm D1 , if it chooses to produce the input for itself, and is w + cT for other
downstream ﬁrms.
Equipped with the input technology, D1 has (at least) three options available:
• Self-suﬃciency: D1 makes the input in house, transfers it into the ﬁnal
product and then competes in the ﬁnal product market with the other
downstream ﬁrms who buy the input from U2 .
• Direct entry to the upstream market: Not only does it produce the input
for itself, D1 also supplies the input to the other downstream ﬁrms. D1
creates a new, upstream unit denoted as U1 which competes with the
incumbent U2 in selling the input to other downstream producers.

9

• Spin-oﬀ: The original ﬁrm D1 breaks into an upstream ﬁrm U1 , which
competes with the incumbent U2 in supplying the input, and a downstream ﬁrm, which continues with the traditional downstream business
of D1 . The key diﬀerence between a spin-oﬀ and direct entry is that
the new upstream unit, U1 , is an independent entity under a spin-oﬀ
whereas it is a part of the downstream ﬁrm D1 under direct entry.

2.1

The Strategic Value of Spin-oﬀs

The basic idea of the model, namely that spin-oﬀs enable a ﬁrm to credibly
expand in the input market, can be illustrated using general proﬁt functions
and oligopoly reaction functions. Suppose that ﬁrms compete in Cournot
fashion in both the downstream and the upstream markets. Given the input
price, w, set in the upstream market, the downstream producers compete by
choosing quantities. These quantities in turn determine the derived demand
for the input. Let πD1 (w) denote the reduced form proﬁt of D1 from the
downstream market. Note that in the absence of a spin-oﬀ πD1 (w) increases
with w because for a higher input price, the cost-advantage that D1 enjoys
over other downstream competitors, w − c, is greater. Now consider the case
of direct entry where D1 enters backward into the input market. When choosing the amount of the input (denoted as Q1 ) to be sold by the new unit U1 ,
the ﬁrm maximizes the total proﬁts πU1 (Q1 , Q2 ) + πD1 (w), where πU1 (Q1 , Q2 )
represents the ﬁrm’s proﬁt from the selling the input in the upstream market
to other (n − 1) downstream producers, and Q2 the output level of the in-
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cumbent supplier U2 . The input price is determined by Cournot competition
between U1 and U2 . The reaction function of U1 is then determined by the
ﬁrst order condition:
∂πU1 (Q1 , Q2 ) ∂πD1 (w) ∂w
+
=0
∂Q1
∂w ∂Q1

(1)

Since competition upstream will drive down the input price (the “helping
the rivals eﬀect”) and

∂πD1 (w)
∂w

> 0, the second term on the left-hand-side of

equation (1) is negative. Thus, for given Q2 the optimal Q1 for U1 must lie
in the range where

∂πU1
∂Q1

> 0.

Under a spin-oﬀ, however, the reaction function of U1 , which is now independent of D1 , is determined by maximization of its own proﬁt only:
∂πU1 (Q1 , Q2 )
= 0.
∂Q1
This results in an output level greater than the one implied by equation (1)
for all Q2 . Therefore, a spin-oﬀ shifts the reaction curve of U1 outwards.
Under the standard stability condition regarding Cournot equilibrium, this
shift leads to a larger equilibrium quantity for U1 and a smaller equilibrium
quantity for U2 , and thus higher upstream proﬁt for U1 . Of course, the input
price will go down as a result of expansion by U1 , lowering the downstream
proﬁt of the original ﬁrm D1 . This basic trade-oﬀ determines whether or not
a spin-oﬀ is a sensible strategy in this model. One expects that the trade-oﬀ
will shift in the direction in favor of a spin-oﬀ if the downstream business is
not very proﬁtable (say, when the number of downstream ﬁrms is very large).
11

The above general arguments have ignored certain details associated with
a spin-oﬀ. For example, under a spin-oﬀ, the original ﬁrm D1 also purchases
the input from the upstream suppliers. Thus the derived demand for the
input is higher under a spin-oﬀ than under direct entry where D1 makes the
input it uses in house. The resulting higher demand for the input will shift the
reaction curves of both U1 and U2 upwards. To isolate the shift of reaction
curve caused by the strategic value of a spin-oﬀ from the shift caused by
the increase in input demand, I will consider two spin-oﬀ situations: partial
spin-oﬀ and complete spin-oﬀ. Under a partial spin-oﬀ, downstream ﬁrm D1
continues to produce the input for itself, whereas under a complete spin-oﬀ
the entire input production line of the original ﬁrm D1 is spun oﬀ (to become
U1 ) and thus D1 has to buy the input from the upstream suppliers at the
market price, like other downstream producers. Under both types of spinoﬀ, the spun–oﬀ ﬁrm is under an independent management. The analysis
of a partial spin-oﬀ highlights the strategic value of spin-oﬀs in the model,
whereas the scenario of a complete spin-oﬀ resembles more real world spin-oﬀ
situations.
In the rest of the paper, I assume that the demand for the ﬁnal product
is given by p = a − Q.

12

3

Self-suﬃciency: The Benchmark Case.

Under self-suﬃciency, ﬁrm D1 produces the input for itself. U2 is the sole
supplier of the input to the other (n − 1) downstream producers. Not having
to suﬀer from the standard double marginalization problem, D1 has a cost
advantage over its downstream rivals who have to buy the input from U2 .
Given the input price, w, set by U2 , the cost conﬁguration for the downstream ﬁrms is (c + cT , w + cT , w + cT , ..., w + cT ). For the linear demand
assumed, the corresponding Cournot equilibrium quantities downstream are
q1 (w) =

a − n(c + cT ) + (n − 1)(w + cT )
a − nc + (n − 1)w − cT
=
n+1
n+1

(2)

for ﬁrm D1 , and
qi (w) =

a − n(w + cT ) + (n − 2)(w + cT ) + c + cT
a − 2w − cT + c
=
(3)
n+1
n+1

for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. The derived demand for the input supplied by U2 is thus6
Q2 (w) = (n − 1)q2 (w) =

(n − 1)(a − 2w − cT + c)
n+1

i.e.,
w=

a − cT + c 1 n + 1
−
Q2 .
2
2n−1

(4)

Facing the derived demand, input supplier U2 simply sets the price at the
monopoly level.
w∗ =

a + 3c − cT
4

6

(5)

Note that the derived demand for the input does not approach to zero as n goes to
inﬁnity.
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The resulting equilibrium quantities, after algebraic simpliﬁcations, are
(a − c − cT )(n + 3)
4(n + 1)

q1∗ =

and q2∗ = . . . = qn∗ =

(a − c − cT )
.
2(n + 1)

The equilibrium output for the industry is
Q∗ = q1∗ + (n − 1)q2∗ =

(a − c − cT )(3n + 1)
4(n + 1)

(6)

and the equilibrium proﬁt of D1 is


(a − c − cT )(n + 3)
π1∗ = (a − c − cT − Q∗ )q1∗ =
4(n + 1)

2

.

Note that π1∗ is a decreasing function of n. As competition downstream
intensiﬁes, ﬁrm D1 ’s proﬁt declines. In the limit where n approaches inﬁnity,
π1∗ = (a − c − cT )2 /16.
The proﬁts of other downstream ﬁrm Di , i ≥ 2, and the proﬁt of the
upstream supplier U2 are
πi∗ = π2∗ = (a − cT − w∗ − Q∗ )q2∗ =

(a − c − cT )2
4(n + 1)2

and
πU∗ 2

∗

= (w − c)(n −

1)q2∗

(n − 1)(a − c − cT )2
=
,
8(n + 1)

respectively.
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4

Direct Entry Into the Upstream Market

Under direct entry into the upstream market, D1 produces the input not only
for its own use, it also sells the input to the other downstream users. Hence,
in addition to the number of input it needs for its own production of the ﬁnal
product, D1 needs to decide on the quantity of the input it sells at the input
market to other downstream competitors. For the ease of exposition, we
denote as U1 the unit of the ﬁrm that is responsible for supplying the input
to outsiders. The key under the direct entry arrangement is that, unlike the
case of spin-oﬀ to be considered later, D1 and U1 remain to be under the
same management of the old ﬁrm and, hence, their decisions are made so as
to maximize their joint proﬁts.
The gain to the ﬁrm associated with entry into the upstream market is the
proﬁt generated from selling the input to other downstream ﬁrms, which can
be attractive when competition downstream is very intense and competition
upstream is not. The problem with this entry, however, is that it will drive
down the input price, thereby helping the downstream rival ﬁrms of D1 . For
the model considered here, it turns out that such a negative eﬀect is so strong
that direct entry is never proﬁtable. We show this next.
Let Q1 and Q2 denote the units of input produced by U1 and U2 , respectively. Given the input price, w, and the marginal cost of D1 , cI + c, the n
downstream ﬁrms compete in Cournot fashion. The resulting quantity for
D1 and the derived demand for the input, by D2 , D3 , ..., and Dn , are the

15

same as in the previous section, namely,
q1 (w) =

a − nc + (n − 1)w − cT
n+1

and
Q1 + Q2 = (n − 1)q2 (w) =

(n − 1)(a − 2w + c − cT )
.
n+1

The derived demand for the input is

w=

a − cT + c 1 n + 1
−
(Q1 + Q2 ).
2
2n−1

(7)

The equilibrium input price, however, is determined by competition between U1 and U2 , rather than set by U2 alone. Of course, in deciding how
much input it sells upstream, U1 must take into account the eﬀect of its decision on the total proﬁts of U1 and D1 . Writing q1 as a function of Q1 and
Q2 by substituting equation (7) into q1 (w), we have
q1 =

a − c − cT
Q1 + Q2
−
.
2
2

(8)

The total proﬁts of U1 and D1 are equal to πU1 + πD1 where
πU1 = (w − c)Q1 =





n + 1 Q1 + Q2
a − c − cT
−
Q1
2
n−1
2

(9)

and
πD1 = (p − c − cT )q1 = [a − c − cT − (Q1 + Q2 + q1 )] q1 .
Using (8), we can rewrite πD1 as


πD1

a − c − cT
Q1 + Q2
=
−
2
2
16

2

.

(10)

The above expression for πD1 clearly shows the negative externality the
newly-created upstream unit imposes on the downstream unit D1 . Given
the output level of U2 , an increase in U1 ’s output level, Q1 , always hurts the
downstream unit. It does so by lowering the input price and hence increasing
the market shares of other downstream competitors.
Although an increase in Q1 can be proﬁtable to the upstream unit, straightforward derivations yield that
(n + 3)Q1 + 2Q2
∂πU1 ∂πD1
+
=−
< 0.
∂Q1
∂Q1
2(n − 1)
Therefore, the negative eﬀect of Q1 on the downstream unit is so strong that
the best choice that maximizes the total proﬁts of U1 and D1 is Q1 = 0 (no
entry) for all Q2 . Thus, we have the following result:
Proposition 1 Assume that p = a − Q. Direct entry by D1 into the input
market never occurs in this model.

5

Partial Spin-oﬀ

Under a partial spin-oﬀ, the newly created upstream unit U1 is under an
independent management. Therefore, when choosing its output U1 does not
have to take into account the proﬁts of D1 : it chooses Q1 to maximize only
its proﬁt πU1 = (w − c)Q1 as opposed to the joint proﬁts πU1 + πD1 . Given
this, the input price is thus determined by the standard (symmetric) Cournot
competition between U1 and U2 .

17

The derived demand for the input under a partial spin-oﬀ is the same as
in the previous section (equation (7)), since the initial downstream unit D1
continues to produce the input in house. Given this derived demand for the
input, upstream duopoly Cournot quantities under a partial spin-oﬀ are
QP1 S = QP2 S =

(a − c − cT )(n − 1)
3(n + 1)

(11)

a + 5c − cT
.
6

(12)

and the equilibrium input price is
wP S =

By equations (2) and (3), the resulting equilibrium output level downstream
is thus
q1P S = q1 (wP S ) =

(a − c − cT )(n + 5)
6(n + 1)

(13)

for ﬁrm D1 , and
q2P S = ... = qnP S =

QP1 S + QP2 S
2(a − c − cT )
=
n−1
3(n + 1)

for other downstream producers.
Consequently, the proﬁts for U1 and D1 are
πUP1S = (wP S − c)QP1 S =

(a − c − cT )2 (n − 1)
18(n + 1)

and




PS
= a − c − cT − q1P S − (n − 1)q2P S q1P S =
πD
1

respectively.
18

(a − c − cT )2 (n + 5)2
,
36(n + 1)2

PS
As the degree of downstream competition increases (n goes up), πD
1

declines, as expected. However, πUP1S rises because the derived demand for
PS
approaches
the input increases with n.7 In the limit (n → ∞), πUP1S + πD
1

λ2 /18 + λ2 /36 = λ2 /12, where λ ≡ (a − c − cT ). Recall that the proﬁt of D1
under self-suﬃciency goes to λ2 /16 as n goes to inﬁnity. The next proposition
shows that a partial spin-oﬀ is more proﬁtable relative to self-suﬃciency if
the number of downstream producers is not small.
PS
> π1∗ if and only if n ≥ 4.
Proposition 2 πUP1S + πD
1
PS
> π1∗ if and only
Proof . By the expressions of the proﬁt functions, πUP1S + πD
1

if
n−1
(n + 5)2
(n + 3)2
+
>
36(n + 1)2 18(n + 1)
16(n + 1)2
which simpliﬁes to
4(n + 5)2 + 8(n + 1)(n − 1) > 9(n + 3)3 .
Further simpliﬁcations reveal that the above inequality holds if and only if
3n2 − 14n + 11 > 0, i.e., n > 3.67.
The reason that a partial a spin-oﬀ can increase total proﬁts for the ﬁrms
relative to self-suﬃciency is as follows. The basic trade-oﬀ associated with
entering into the input market remains present here under a spin-oﬀ, namely
that entry into the input market enables U1 to capture proﬁts from the upstream market but at the same time hurts the downstream proﬁtability of
7

PS
PS
The sum of πU
and πD
decreases in n.
1
1
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D1 . When downstream market competition is intense (n ≥ 4), the downstream business is not as important as it is for a smaller n. As a result, the
upstream (duopoly) proﬁts are large enough to oﬀset the downstream losses.
What might be surprising is that a spin-oﬀ can yield higher proﬁts than
self-suﬃciency while direct entry cannot. As shown in the previous section,
the joint proﬁts of U1 and D1 always decrease with Q1 for any given Q2 ,
which is of course also true under a spin-oﬀ. How can it be possible that the
joint proﬁts are higher under a spin-oﬀ where the equilibrium Q1 is positive?
The reason is that a spin-oﬀ forces U2 to lower its output from the monopoly
level Q∗2 to the Cournot duopoly level QP2 S . As Q2 declines and when n ≥ 4,
U1 and D1 earn higher joint proﬁts under a partial spin-oﬀ.

6

Complete Spin-Oﬀ

Under a complete spin-oﬀ, the entire input production line of D1 gets spun
oﬀ to form the new upstream ﬁrm U1 . Like all other downstream producers,
D1 now has to purchase the input from the upstream suppliers U1 and U2 ,
at the market price w.
Given w, the n downstream ﬁrms are now on equal footing each having a marginal cost of w + cT . The corresponding Cournot output of each
downstream ﬁrm is
qi =

a − w − cT
,
n+1
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yielding the following derived demand for the input
w = a − cT −

n+1
Q,
n

where Q = nqi .

Relative to the derived demand in the previous sections, a complete spin-oﬀ
raises the demand for the input. Not only does D1 now buy the input in
the upstream market, the other (n − 1) downstream ﬁrms each demands a
larger quantity of the input for a given w because D1 now no longer possess
a cost-advantage over them.
Facing the above derived demand, U1 and U2 compete in Cournot fashion,
leading to the following equilibrium quantities under a complete spin-oﬀ:
CS
QCS
1 = Q2 =

n(a − c − cT )
.
3(n + 1)

(14)

The resulting equilibrium input price is then
wCS = a − cT −

n + 1 CS
a − cT + 2c
(Q1 + QCS
.
2 ) =
n
3

(15)

Straightforward derivations yield the following proﬁts for each upstream supplier and each downstream producer:
= πUCS
= (wCS − c)QCS
πUCS
1 =
1
2

n(a − c − cT )2
,
9(n + 1)

and
CS
CS
CS
= (a − QCS
− cT )
πD
1 − Q2 − w
i

=

4(a − c − cT )2
, i = 1, ..., n.
9(n + 1)2
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CS
QCS
1 + Q2
n

Comparing the above proﬁts with those under a partial spin-oﬀ, we have
CS
PS
πUCS
+ πD
> πUP1S + πD
if and only if
1
1
1

n−1
n
4
(n + 5)2
>
,
+
+
9(n + 1) 9(n + 1)2
18(n + 1) 36(n + 1)2
which after rearranging terms becomes
1
(n + 5)2 − 16
.
>
18
36(n + 1)2
The above inequality, after further simpliﬁcations, is equivalent to (n−7)(n+
1) > 0. Therefore, we have the following result.
Proposition 3 Assume that p = a − Q. A complete spin-oﬀ yields greater
joint proﬁts for U1 and D1 than does a partial spin-oﬀ if and only if n > 7.
As the number of downstream ﬁrms increases, a self-suﬃcient downstream
unit becomes less and less proﬁtable, as its price-cost margin, p − c − cT ,
shrinks and its output declines. Switching from a partial spin-oﬀ to a complete spin-oﬀ enables the ﬁrm to further shift its business from the less profitable downstream market to the upstream market. It does so by increasing
the derived demand for the input: Relative to a partial spin-oﬀ, a complete
spin-oﬀ increases the equilibrium quantities of all other n − 1 downstream
ﬁrms as it eliminates the cost-advantage that D1 enjoyed under a partial
spin-oﬀ. This increased demand for the input translates into greater proﬁt
for U1 . Such a business-refocusing strategy is proﬁtable when n is suﬃciently
large.
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Furthermore, since D1 now has to buy the input from the upstream suppliers, U1 ’s expansion in the upstream market under a complete spin-oﬀ actually beneﬁts D1 , unlike in the case of a partial spin-oﬀ where an increase
in the output U1 reduces input price and helps the downstream competitors
of D1 .

6.1

Spin-oﬀ Decision

PS
CS
Let v(n) ≡ max{π1∗ (n), πUP1S (n) + πD
(n), πUCS
(n) + πD
(n)}. Combining the
1
1
1

previous propositions, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 For the linear demand p = a − Q, the optimal form of organization for the original ﬁrm D1 is given by









π1∗ (n),

if n < 4

PS
(n),
v(n) =  πUP1S (n) + πD
1








if 4 ≤ n ≤ 7

CS
(n) + πD
(n), if n > 7
πUCS
1
1

















.

That is, the ﬁrm will remain self-suﬃcient if n is smaller than 4, adopt
the partial spin-oﬀ strategy if n is between 4 and 7, and will choose complete
spin-oﬀ if n > 7. The proﬁt functions are depicted in Figure 1 below.
(Insert Figure 1 here.)
Because a spin-oﬀ represents a shift of core business from the downstream
level to the upstream level in this model, the pattern of the optimal strategy
as given in the above proposition comes at no surprise. If the degree of
downstream competition is low (n < 4), the traditional business of the ﬁrm
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concerned is still proﬁtable and a spin-oﬀ, which would help downstream rival
ﬁrms, is not justiﬁed. If there are a large number of downstream producers
(n > 7), entry into the upstream market by means of a spin-oﬀ is proﬁtable
as the market demand for the input is large and the negative eﬀect of such
entry on the old downstream unit is small. If the degree of downstream
competition is in the intermediate range and thus the downstream business
is still moderately attractive, shutting down the in-house production of the
input is too costly. Therefore, the ﬁrm chooses instead a partial spin-oﬀ in
this case.

7

Welfare Eﬀect of Spin-oﬀs

Spin-oﬀs in this model aﬀect welfare in two ways. On the one hand, spin-oﬀs
tend to improve social welfare as they increase competition in the input market. On the other hand, however, accompanying a spin-oﬀ is the production
shift downstream from the once self-suﬃcient D1 to other downstream ﬁrms
who have to rely on upstream suppliers for the input. Therefore, spin-oﬀs
worsen the standard double marginalization problem in a two-tier industry. In fact, under a complete spin-oﬀ, ﬁrm D1 also suﬀers from the double
marginalization problem. Hence, relative to self-suﬃciency, spin-oﬀs have
an eﬀect of reducing welfare. The net eﬀect of a spin-oﬀ on welfare thus
depends on the magnitudes of the above two opposing forces. We can show
the following results concerning the equilibrium output, ﬁnal product price,
social welfare, and the price of the input.
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Proposition 5
(i) QP S > Q∗ > QCS and pP S < p∗ < pCS for all n;
(ii) Relative to no spin-oﬀ, and for all n, a partial spin-oﬀ improves social
welfare and a complete spin-oﬀ reduces it; and
(iii) wP S < w∗ < wCS .
Proof . By equations (6), (11), (13), and (14), we have Q∗ =
QP S ≡ QP1 S + QP2 S + q1P S =
CS
QCS ≡ QCS
=
1 + Q2

2(n−1)(a−c−cT )
3(n+1)

2n(a−c−cT )
.
3(n+1)

T)
+ (n+5)(a−c−c
=
6(n+1)

(a−c−cT )(3n+1)
,
4(n+1)

(5n+1)(a−c−cT )
6(n+1)

and

Straightforward comparison of the output

levels yields the results in part (i).
To prove part (ii), note that whether or not the ﬁrm chooses a spin-oﬀ,
all units of the total output of the industry are produced at the marginal
cost c + cT , although the output allocations among ﬁrms vary. Thus, proﬁt
per unit of the output is always p − c − cT for the industry regardless of
which form of the industrial organization (self-suﬃcient, partial spin-oﬀ, or
complete spin-oﬀ) is chosen. What are diﬀerent under diﬀerent organization
forms are the aggregate output level and the way per unit proﬁt is shared
among the input suppliers and the downstream producers. These, together
with the fact that social welfare is given by the area under the demand curve
and above the level of c + cT , imply that welfare has the same rank as that
of the equilibrium output levels given in part (i). This proves part (ii).8
8

Simulation results based on the derived proﬁt functions and the corresponding consumer surplus under self-suﬃciency and spin-oﬀs were in conﬁrmation with the general
arguments presented here.
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Part (iii) of the proposition follows by noting the expressions for the input
price (5), (12), and (15), and that a − c − cT > 0.
The eﬀects of spin-oﬀs on output and prices are easy to understand.
Relative to self-suﬃciency, a partial spin-oﬀ increases upstream competition
without lowering the production eﬃciency of the downstream ﬁrm. Of course,
following a partial spin-oﬀ the output level of the downstream ﬁrm D1 drops
and that of the other downstream ﬁrms rises. This means that a larger portion of the ﬁnal product sold to the consumers involves the standard double
marginalization problem. But the eﬀect of increased competition upstream
is so strong that input price and the ﬁnal price end up lower under a partial
spin-oﬀ. As a result, welfare is enhanced. Under a complete spin-oﬀ, however, the price of all units of the ﬁnal product gets raised twice, once by the
input suppliers and then by the downstream producers, from the respective
marginal costs of production, before they reach the ﬁnal consumers. This
loss in downstream production eﬃciency raises the price of the ﬁnal product
and lowers welfare.
The result that wP S < w∗ < wCS is also easy to understand. Relative
to the benchmark case, a partial spin-oﬀ increases upstream competition
without raising the derived demand for the input (because D1 remains selfsuﬃcient). As a result, input price declines in equilibrium. A complete
spin-oﬀ, on the other hand, eliminates the cost advantage D1 once enjoyed
over other downstream ﬁrms and increases the demand for the input because
D1 now also purchases the input from the upstream market. These factors
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are so strong that input price ends up increasing under a complete spin-oﬀ,
despite of entry of U1 into the input market.

7.1

Policy Implications

The above results have clear policy implications, namely that spin-oﬀs, which
increase the number of ﬁrms in the industry, are not always welfare improving. In particular, a complete spin-oﬀ in our model always reduces social
welfare, although a partial spin-oﬀ always enhances welfare. As mentioned
earlier, the eﬃciency loss created by a complete spin-oﬀ in this model stems
from the fact that it raises the magnitude of the standard double marginalization problem through two channels. First, it exposes the continuation
ﬁrm (D1 ) to the problem of double marginalization. Second, such exposure
shifts the industry output downstream from the more eﬃcient ﬁrm toward
those who have been already suﬀering from the problem. These eﬀects tend
to raise the input price as they increase the demand for the input. Precisely
because of this, input price rises under a complete spin-oﬀ, rather than drops
as one might expect when entry into the input market occurs. Higher input
price and resource ﬂow to less eﬃcient producers result in an increase in the
price of the ﬁnal product and a reduction in social welfare. Such detrimental
eﬀects of spin-oﬀs have been overlooked in the literature. This paper shows
that they can be strong enough for spin-oﬀs to be welfare-reducing.
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8

Conclusion

When a self-suﬃcient producer enters backward into the upstream input
market, a “helping the rivals eﬀect” exists: Such entry increases the degree
of competition in the input market, thereby driving down the input costs of
the ﬁrm’s downstream competitors. This negative eﬀect hurts the traditional
downstream business of the ﬁrm and thus limits its expansion in the input
market. We show that spin-oﬀs confer a strategic advantage on the ﬁrm.
By freeing the spun-oﬀ unit from having to worry about the downstream
businesses of its parent company, spin-oﬀs enable the ﬁrm to credibly expand
its upstream business. This in turn forces the upstream rival ﬁrms to behave
less aggressively than they would in the absence of a spin-oﬀ. Spin-oﬀs
increase the joint proﬁts of the spun-oﬀ ﬁrm and its parent company, as long
as the number of downstream ﬁrms is large.
The current US antitrust laws do not have speciﬁc provisions governing
corporate spin-oﬀs. Yet our model shows that spin-oﬀs can reduce welfare as
they worsen the magnitude of the standard double marginalization problem.
The possible negative welfare eﬀects of spin-oﬀs have been overlooked by
economists and policy makers.
Although obtained in a simple model, the main results of the model would
continue to hold in more general settings, as argued in section 2. The “helping the rivals eﬀect” should in general exist whenever a downstream producer
enters backward into the input market. The value of a spin-oﬀ as a commit-
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ment device for expansion in the input market is not speciﬁc to the simple
model considered here, although the result that direct entry never occurs
may fail to hold for nonlinear demand. In general, one expects that the
ﬁrm under direct entry may produce a positive quantity, albeit smaller than
that under a spin-oﬀ, in the input market. Finally, if there is an upstream
oligopoly rather than a duopoly, it should be clear that spin-oﬀs are less
likely to occur.
My model here focuses on the strategic value spin-oﬀs can confer to a
ﬁrm by freeing up its constraint in the input market. Another constraint an
integrated ﬁrm might face in reality is that its downstream competitors may
not want to procure their inputs from the ﬁrm for the fear that so doing would
reveal their business plans and product designs to the downstream unit of the
integrated ﬁrm. Such a situation is likely to arise if speciﬁc investments are
necessary for making inputs for downstream customers.9 In such a situation,
a spin-oﬀ not only confers the spun-oﬀ ﬁrm a strategic advantage in the
input market, as analyzed in the present model, it also gives the downstream
continuation ﬁrm more freedom to compete without having to be concerned
about oﬀending other downstream input buyers. A study of such strategic
interaction in the downstream market and its implication for spin-oﬀs seem
warranted for future research.
9

For instance, one major factor in the AT&T-Lucent case was that prior to the spin-oﬀ
the Baby Bells, which were the biggest customers of AT&T, became reluctant to buy from
AT&T, a competitor in cellular markets and a potential competitor in local markets. See
Miles and Woolridge (1999) for a detail study of the spin-oﬀ of Lucent Technologies by
AT&T.
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One can also examine spin-oﬀ incentives in the case where input suppliers compete in Bertrand fashion. Since input suppliers’ decisions under
Bertrand competition are strategic complements, more aggressive behavior
on the part of the spun-oﬀ ﬁrm U1 would trigger more competitive behavior by the incumbent input supplier. One thus expects that spin-oﬀs are
less likely to occur in a price setting game than in a quantity setting game
considered here. However, since (complete) spin-oﬀs also increase the derived demand for the input, the incumbent input supplier will raise input
price after a spin-oﬀ, which “softens” competition in the input market and
thus enhances the incentive for a spin-oﬀ. Future research along this line
is certainly worth pursuing. One diﬃculty with this approach is to build
up a model that incorporates product diﬀerentiation into a two-tier vertical
model, especially when the number of upstream suppliers is not equal to that
of the downstream producers. I do not know of any existing models in the
literature that are suitable to accomplish this task.
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